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Abstract 
We combine the concepts of legitimacy, institutional (mis)alignments, strategic 
responses and organizing visions to develop a conceptual framework to analyse the 
adoption of innovations that span organisational fields. We apply the framework to 
examine a telehealth innovation connecting a public sector hospital-based eye clinic 
with private sector optometry practices. We find that while compromise strategies 
were successful in encouraging adoption within each field, the innovation ultimately 
failed as fields developed different organising visions which could not be reconciled. 
                                                     
1 This manuscript has been accepted for publication in Information and Management journal. 
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The findings suggest that institutional misalignments within and between fields 
interact to amplify their overall effect on the adoption of hybrid innovations.  
 
Keywords 
IT innovation adoption; hybrid innovation; institutional misalignments; strategic 
responses; organizing vision; 
Introduction 
The decision to adopt IT innovations, as well as the success of adoption depends on 
the alignment between the innovation and institutional characteristics such as 
mandates from powerful organizations, professional norms, and established ways of 
working that are prevalent within the adopting organisational fields (e.g. Chatterjee 
et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2008; Teo et al., 2003; for a review see Mignerat and Rivard, 
2009). However, as environments become more complex and contested, 
organizations increasingly experience conflicting institutional demands (Pache and 
Santos, 2010). Conflicting institutional demands are important as they call into 
question the ability of innovator actors to align an innovation successfully with the 
range of diverse and inconsistent institutional logics that characterise adopting 
organizational fields (Currie and Guah, 2007). Misalignments between conflicting 
demands become an even bigger challenge when adoption cuts across different 
organizational fields characterised by diverse institutional logics. Despite the 
increased prevalence of such misaligned and contested environments, there has been 
little systematic effort in IT innovation research to study the role of institutional 
misalignments, particularly where the adoption of the innovation happens across 
different organizational fields. Nor has the role that such misalignments play in 
influencing the adoption of IT innovations at organizational level been investigated. 
Nevertheless, the extent of misalignments between different institutional logics 
within the environment in which innovations are introduced plays a critical role in 
shaping their adoption (see Currie and Guah, 2007). The goal of this paper is to 
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develop an understanding of the nature of these misalignments and how they 
influence the adoption of IT innovations. 
 
We build upon existing institutional research on IT adoption to examine the influence 
of institutional misalignments on the adoption of IT innovations spanning different 
organizational fields (which we term “boundary spanning innovations”). We argue 
that these kinds of boundary spanning innovations have a hybrid nature, similar to the 
hybrid organization concept in institutional research (see Battilana and Dorado, 2010) 
in that innovation adoption requires a combination of diverse institutional logics. The 
adoption of boundary spanning innovations necessitates collaboration between 
adopting organizations in different organizational fields characterised by different 
norms, rules and procedures. Thus, to be successful, boundary spanning innovations 
need to strike a balance between various institutional expectations and demands that 
characterise the different adopting organizational fields. Our first research question is 
thus: 
 
RQ1: What are the institutional factors that influence the adoption of boundary 
spanning IT innovations by individual organizations? 
 
Within the information systems literature there is some evidence that competing 
institutional demands influence IT innovation adoption within particular 
organizational fields (see for example Currie and Guah’s 2007 study on the evolution 
of a UK-wide healthcare IT programme). Such studies have, however, examined 
tensions within, rather than between, organizational fields, and have often focused at 
the field level, thus failing to explain variations in adoption at organizational level. We 
have found no detailed research examining the role played by misalignments between 
institutional norms in shaping the organizational adoption of IT innovations spanning 
different organizational fields. Yet, we argue, these misalignments are more intense 
in the case of boundary spanning IT innovations. Our next research questions are thus: 
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RQ2: How do institutional misalignments arise within (RQ2a) and between (RQ2b) 
organizational fields involved in the adoption of boundary spanning innovations? and; 
RQ3: How do institutional misalignments within (RQ3a) and between (RQ3b) 
organizational fields influence the adoption of boundary spanning innovations within 
individual organizations?  
 
We focus here on the adoption of a telehealth system to support the provision of 
glaucoma care in one Health Board in Scotland. Telehealth has been defined as ‘[t]he 
delivery of healthcare services, where distance is a critical factor, by all healthcare 
professionals using information and communication technologies for the exchange of 
valid information for diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease and injuries, 
research and evaluation, and for the continuing education of healthcare providers, all 
in the interests of advancing the health of individuals and their communities” (WHO, 
2010 p. 9). The telehealth innovation under study involved privately owned optometry 
practices carrying out routine checks for some glaucoma patients, and sending the 
results of these checks to a consultant in a hospital-based Eye Clinic. The hospital was 
part of the publicly owned UK National Health Service (NHS). The innovation thus 
spanned the public sector Eye Clinic and privately owned optometry practices. 
Drawing from a rich, in depth single case study, this paper develops a conceptual 
framework to examine the mechanisms that lead to the emergence of institutional 
misalignments, and the outcome that these misalignments have on the adoption of 
boundary spanning innovation. 
Literature Review 
New-institutional theory: legitimacy, institutional pressures and response strategies 
Institutional theory argues that organizations operate within fields that are 
characterised by a shared understanding of appropriate organizational forms and 
behaviours (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The need for organizations to gain legitimacy 
in order to increase their probability of survival within their specific environment 
creates pressures for organizations to conform to these institutional expectations, 
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even if these expectations have little to do with rational norms of efficiency. DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) identified three types of institutional pressures: coercive, 
normative, and mimetic. Coercive pressures result from formal and informal pressures 
from powerful organizations, and from embedded societal cultural expectations; 
mimetic pressures arise in conditions of high uncertainty and may cause an 
organization to imitate others that are seen as successful in the field; normative 
pressures manifest themselves through professionalization, generally through the 
relational networks that span organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987). 
 
An organization has legitimacy within its organizational field when its actions are 
perceived as “desirable, proper or appropriate” within its particular environment 
(Suchman, 1995, pg. 574). Organizational legitimacy can thus be understood as the 
social acceptance of organizational practices (Scherer et al., 2013). Institutional 
research distinguishes between different forms of organizational legitimacy. We 
follow Ruef and Scott (1998) who, drawing from a study of innovation in healthcare, 
identified two forms of legitimacy within organizations: technical and managerial. 
Technical legitimacy considers the core technology, including normative support for 
staff qualifications, training programmes, work procedures and quality assurance 
mechanisms. Managerial legitimacy focuses on organizational mechanisms, including 
normative support for personnel management, accounting practices, and rules of 
conduct for administrative staff (Ruef and Scott, 1998). 
 
To gain legitimacy, organizations can choose between a range of institutional 
responses to the institutional pressures within their environment (e.g. Schuman, 
1995, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Here we follow Oliver (1991), who identified five 
strategies to maintain, repair or gain legitimacy: acquiescence, compromise, 
avoidance, defiance and manipulation. Acquiescence is an organization’s unqualified 
conformity to external pressures; compromise refers to an organization’s attempts to 
balance, pacify or bargain with external constituents to match conflicting institutional 
expectations; avoidance refers to an organization’s efforts to circumvent the need to 
conform to external pressures; defying involves the rejection of institutional norms: 
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while manipulation is aimed at actively changing the content of the institutional 
expectations or the sources through which these expectations are exerted (Oliver, 
1991). The core framework proposed by the institutional theory is depicted in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: Institutional theory framework 
 
Institutional literature in general, and information systems research in particular, has 
focused on acquiescence, and little effort has been made to explore the other 
strategic responses to institutional pressures (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). There is, 
however, growing evidence that organizations employ other types of strategic 
responses in response to conflicting institutional demands (Pache and Santos, 2010; 
Scherer et al., 2013) and that these responses vary over time (Standing et al., 2009). 
Institutional theory and IT innovation adoption 
An increasing body of literature examines IT innovation adoption from an institutional 
perspective (see Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). To answer our research questions, this 
study draws from three different streams of institutional IT research (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Different streams of institutional research on IT adoption 
 
STREAM 1: A recent review found that most IT institutional research (68%) examined 
the influence of institutional pressures at the different stages of IT adoption in 
organizations (see Figure 2) (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). Varying combinations of 
institutional pressures have been found to influence all stages of adoption, ranging 
from the intention to adopt to assimilation, across different types of IT innovation, 
ranging from EDI to grid computing (see Table 1). Most studies have focussed on 
acquiescence strategy, assuming that the only possible response to institutional 
pressures is conformity (see for instance Gosian, 2004). In one of the few exceptions 
in the information systems literature, Standing et al. (2009) showed that, in engaging 
with an IT innovation, organizations adopted a variety of strategic responses, ranging 
over time from conformity to non-conformity. 
 
Stage of adoption Type of IT innovation (authors) 
Intention to adopt Electronic Data Interchange (Teo et al., 2003);  
B2B electronic market places (Son and Benbasat, 2007); 
IT facilitated virtualisation (Liu et al., 2008); 
RFID (Tsai et al., 2013); 
Grid computing (Messerschmidt and Hinz, 2013); 
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Internet enabled supply chain management systems (Liu et al., 
2010) 
Adoption Purchasing and sales e-business systems (Hertwig, 2012); 
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) (Benders et al., 2006) 
Implementation Electronic human resource management practices (Hiekkila, 
2013); 
ERP (Benders et al., 2006) 
Assimilation Web technologies (Chatterjee et al., 2002); 
Internet-based inter-organizational systems (Sodero et al., 
2013);  
ERP (Liang et al., 2007) 
Table 1. Studies of conforming to institutional pressures and IT adoption stages 
 
STREAM 2: Research has also examined, although to a more limited extent, the role of 
institutional misalignments in IT adoption (see Figure 2). In particular, research has 
considered the tensions between (i) institutional arrangements in one organizational 
field within which innovation happens; and (ii) the institutional logic embodied within 
the IT innovation itself. For example, misalignments between institutional 
arrangements on one hand and a medical innovation (Cho and Mathiassen, 2007; 
Jensen et al., 2009), or a nationwide IT programme (Currie and Guah, 2007) on the 
other, were found to explain the lack of adoption within healthcare settings. Similarly, 
it has been suggested that mismatches between the institutional logic embodied 
within a new information system and the dominant institutional logic within the 
adopting organization create resistance to the implementation of IT innovations at an 
organizational level (Gosain, 2004).  
 
STREAM 3: Organizational adoption of IT innovations has also been explained by 
examining the perceptions and responses of organizational members to the organizing 
vision associated with an IT innovation (see Figure 2) (Marsan et al., 2012; Sawnson 
and Ramiller, 2004). An organizing vision embodies the early efforts of a diverse 
community of prospective adopters, technology vendors, consultant firms and 
industry experts to make sense of the innovation as an organizational opportunity 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). A compelling organizing vision can support innovation 
adoption and diffusion by reconciling different interpretations of the IT innovation, 
legitimising the innovation within the adopting organizational fields, and organizing 
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and mobilising resources to support the innovation (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). In 
contrast, when the innovation is characterised by mismatching interpretations and 
mixed messages within a community, the ability of users to make sense of the 
innovation is hampered. This situation produces contradictory expectations within the 
community and obstructs the formation of a coherent organizing vision, thus leading 
to the innovation failing within an organizational field (Currie, 2004). 
 
Existing research has demonstrated the need for alignment between the innovation 
and the institutional demands prevalent within the adoption field (RQ1), thus 
significantly advancing our understanding of the role of institutions for innovation 
adoption. This understanding is however not yet complete. First, until recently most 
IT research assumed a cohesive set of institutional norms to which adopting 
organizations conform. It also assumed that these norms align to influence IT adoption 
(see Chatterjee et al., 2002; Teo et al., 2003; Son and Bensabat, 2007) (STREAM 1). 
There is, however, mounting evidence that organizations are subject to competing 
institutional demands within their organizational fields (Reay and Hinings, 2009; 
Scherer et al., 2013), and that these conflicting demands influence IT innovation 
adoption (Butler, 2003) and diffusion (Currie and Guah, 2007). However, existing 
information systems research has primarily examined one category of conflicts - 
misalignments between the organizational field and the institutional demands 
embodied within the IT artefact (see Gosian, 2004; Jensen et al., 2009) (STREAM 2). In 
contrast, little attention has been paid to the institutional conflicts inherent within the 
organizational field itself. As environments become more complex and fragmented it 
is likely that organizations will be increasingly subjected to conflicting institutional 
demands (Pache and Santos, 2010) that will shape their approach to IT innovation. 
How these conflicting institutional demands arise (RQ2a) and shape the adoption of 
innovation within a particular organizational field (RQ3a) is not yet clear (see Gap 1 in 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Gap 1: Conflicting institutional factors within organizational fields and 
different responses 
 
In answering these questions, this study draws from the concepts of managerial and 
technical legitimacy (Ruef and Scott, 1998), and response strategies to institutional 
pressures (Oliver, 1991). IT institutional research does not generally differentiate 
between types of legitimacy within adopting organizations. Managerial and technical 
legitimacy are, however, governed by different, and often conflicting, societal values 
(Ruef and Scott, 1998). Misalignments between technical and managerial norms are 
particularly evident in professional organizations that are characterised by broadly 
defined groups where these groups are subject to different values and expectations 
(Ferlie et al., 2005). For example, in a healthcare setting doctors (professionals) and 
administrators (managers) will have different values and expectations (Willcocks, 
2004), as will musicians and administrators in symphony orchestras (Glynn, 2000). The 
professional groups seek technical legitimacy, focusing on norms of professional 
excellence (quality of patient care and specialism training for doctors and artistic 
excellence for musicians). The managerial groups seek managerial legitimacy through 
norms such as economic efficiency and cost-containment (Glynn, 2000; Ruef and 
Scott, 1998). Consequently, tensions between the ‘technical’ and ‘managerial’ 
institutional pressures may lead to institutional misalignment. Organisations can 
respond to these institutional misalignments in different ways. For example efforts 
can be made to balance the competing technical and managerial pressures. 
Alternatively, organisations might attempt to persuade the different stakeholders to 
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alter their institutional demands, or they might even avoid compliance all together 
(Oliver, 1991). Different responses to institutional misalignments may influence their 
decision to adopt an innovation, as well as the success of adoption.  
 
With few exceptions, misalignments between technical and managerial norms are not 
considered in IT research. For example, institutional misalignments within UK 
healthcare were identified by Currie and Guah (2007) and were found to both fuel and 
inhibit the diffusion of a nationwide IT innovation. The conflicts within the healthcare 
field were explained largely based on the fragmentation of the organizational field, 
which was characterised by the conflict between public and private sector ethoses 
(see also Reay and Hinings, 2009). This fragmentation made it difficult to reach a 
consensus between the various IT programme stakeholders and explained the lack of 
adoption (Currie and Guah, 2007). Building upon these findings on the diffusion of 
innovation at field level, our research considers individual organizations, and 
examines the mechanisms through which institutional misalignments within particular 
organizational fields emerge (RQ2a) and shape IT adoption within individual 
organizations (RQ3a). 
 
Second, existing IT institutional research focuses on IT innovation adoption within a 
single organizational field. However, as early as the 1980s researchers pointed out 
that modern organizations frequently operate in multiple fields (Scott, 1987). While 
cross-field institutional demands might be less evident for single-field IT innovations, 
they are a defining characteristic of the adoption of boundary spanning innovations, 
whose development and adoption takes place in multiple fields, subject to varying 
institutional norms. How these conflicting institutional demands arise (RQ2b) and 
influence the adoption of innovation across different organizational fields (RQ3b) is 
not clear (see Figure 4) and is the second research gap addressed by this research. 
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Figure 4. Gap 2: Conflicting institutional factors across organizational fields and 
different organizing visions 
 
In examining these questions, this study draws upon the concept of ‘organizing vision’ 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). Faced with an IT innovation, organizations form 
expectations about the innovation. These expectations provide a framework that 
enables organizational members to make sense of the innovation; it guides their 
perceptions and decision-making about, and actions in dealing with, the innovation. 
Innovation adoption by individual organizations does not, however, take place in 
isolation. Organizations are part of a broader community of actors who are interested 
in the development and adoption of the innovation. Other members of this broader 
community might develop their own conceptual frameworks. As community members 
interact, they bring together their individual conceptual frameworks, which are 
adapted, refashioned and altered to form a vision for organizing the innovation in a 
way that embeds and utilises the innovation within existing organizational structures 
and processes (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). 
 
The concept of organizing vision was originally developed to explain the 
institutionalisation of IT innovations at field level, and has recently been applied to 
examine adoption at an inter-organizational level (Lyytinen and Damsgaard, 2011). 
Here we adapt the concept of organizing vision to explain adoption at organizational 
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level. The way in which community members negotiate their individual conceptual 
frameworks between themselves, and/or in relation to the emerging organizing vision, 
may influence their decision on whether or not to engage in an innovation. For 
example Marsan et al. (2012) found that when specific organizational members held 
positive perceptions of the organizing vision of an innovation, the organization was 
more likely to favour adoption. Moreover, competing organizing visions may develop 
between different organizational fields: in their attempt to make sense of a boundary 
spanning innovation, adopting organizations may form conflicting understandings of 
the application of the innovation within their particular fields. For example, in the 
context of technology development, conflicting institutional demands across 
institutional fields were found to lead to different expectations within the 
standardisation community about the organization of standardisation bodies 
(Bunduchi et al., 2008). The way in which potential adopters are able to resolve the 
conflicts between their particular expectations for the innovation may explain the 
outcome of the innovation. For examples, for an organizational “boundary spanning” 
innovation, Batillana and Dorado (2010) found that the success of a new hybrid form 
of organization depended on the ability of the organization to balance the different 
institutional logics. Building upon this argument, our study identified the drivers for 
the emergence of institutional misalignments across different organizational fields 
involved in IT adoption (RQ2b), and their role in shaping the adoption of boundary 
spanning IT innovations (RQ3b). 
Methods  
Case study research design 
The research followed an interpretative research design (Walsham, 1993) with a single 
instrumental case study (Stake, 1995) of a telehealth innovation for glaucoma care in 
one Scottish Health Board. The interpretative approach was chosen because we 
focused on the context (the institutional pressures) of IT adoption and the process 
through which the IT adoption was shaped by this context (see Walsham, 1993). The 
case study research method was chosen because of its ability to provide rich and 
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detailed data (Yin, 2003) on the perceptions of the various stakeholders involved in 
the adoption of the innovation. In depth data allows for thick descriptions of the case 
(Stake, 1995), in particular of the contextual setting (Yin, 2003) in which the innovation 
happens. Rich contextual understanding is critical to explain the institutional factors 
that shape the adoption of IT. Moreover, case study research design has been widely 
used in social sciences for both theory testing and theory development (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The design thus suited our approach that blends theory development 
(understanding how institutional misalignments arise and their influence on the 
adoption of hybrid innovations) and theory testing (examining the institutional 
pressures that influence the adoption of hybrid innovation).  
 
To answer our research questions, we first needed to identify the institutional factors 
that influenced the decision to adopt the telehealth innovation within the different 
adopting organizational fields, and to link these observed factors to the factors 
derived from existing institutional research on IT adoption (RQ1). This pattern 
matching technique between empirically observed and theoretical expected patterns 
is a common approach to support theory testing in single case study research designs 
(Yin, 2003). Once these patterns of institutional pressures had been identified, a 
detailed analysis of the conditions under which misalignments between these 
pressures arose (RQ2), and the pattern of strategic responses from potential adopters 
(RQ3) followed. This analysis involved iterative comparisons between the emerging 
theory and the case study data (see Eisenhardt, 1989) and served to build an 
understanding of (i) how misalignments emerged through demands for different types 
of legitimacies, and (ii) how responses to these misalignments led to conflicting 
organizing visions within each adopting field, and how these conflicting organizing 
visions ultimately shaped the decision to abandon the innovation (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Research design 
 
The selection of the case study matched the intensity criterion (Miles and Huberman, 
1998). The health sector is widely documented as being highly institutionalised (see 
Currie, 2012; Scott et al., 2000) and it was therefore likely that institutional pressures 
in the sector would be more intense in shaping innovation adoption than in other 
organizational fields. Cases where the intensity of the phenomena is extreme are well 
suited to theory testing (RQ1) in single case study designs (Yin, 2003). 
 
Although Eisenhardt (1989) recommends multiple case studies for theory 
development, single case study research design has also been used extensively for 
theory building (RQ2&3) in institutional information systems literature (see for 
example Butler, 2003; Cho and Mathiassen, 2007; Jensen et al., 2009), and is widely 
considered to be a legitimate endeavour in qualitative interpretative research in 
information systems (Klein and Myers, 1999; Lee and Baskerville, 2003). A common 
criticism of single case study research for theory building is its inability to provide 
generalisable findings in the positivistic sense. In qualitative research, however, the 
development of a thick description of a context is more important than the 
identification of a large representative sample. Thick description enables the 
development of theories to explain the behaviour and actions that are deeply rooted 
in the context of the particular case study (Lee and Baskerville, 2003). By providing a 
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thick description of the adoption context our study enables comparisons with other 
settings engaged in the adoption of boundary spanning innovation in contested 
environments, permitting naturalistic generalisation (Stake, 1995), in which the 
findings from a single case study can be applied to understand other innovations 
occurring in similar contexts (Schofield, 2002). 
Research setting 
The case study involved the adoption of a telehealth innovation to support glaucoma 
care in one Health Board in Scotland, UK. The innovation was designed to connect the 
public hospital-based Eye Clinic with the private sector optometry practices. 
Glaucoma is a degenerative eye condition involving damage to the optic nerve. It is 
the second most common cause of blindness in the world, and is more prevalent in 
people over seventy-five (Quigley, 1996). Generally the condition progresses slowly 
(stable glaucoma), but in acute cases the disease progresses rapidly (ibid.). Once 
diagnosed with glaucoma, patients require regular checks to monitor the progress of 
the disease. The frequency of checks varies depending on the nature of patient’s 
condition (stable or more acute) and is generally every six months for stable glaucoma 
patients (NICE, 2009). Until the pilot intervention described in the study, the checks 
were carried out at Eye Clinics located in two public hospitals within the Health Board. 
The telehealth pilot involved moving the monitoring of one hundred patients with 
stable glaucoma from the Eye Clinic to six private local optometry practices over a six-
month period in 2009 for one, and in some cases two, glaucoma appointments. The 
optometry practices carried out routine checks for patients with slowly progressing 
(stable) glaucoma and, using the existing NHS IT network, emailed the results of these 
checks to the consultant in the Eye Clinic. The six optometry practices that agreed to 
take part in the telehealth pilot all had the necessary equipment to conduct the tests 
and transmit the results. The patients were selected randomly from patients with 
stable glaucoma who required appointments at the Clinic during the six months when 
the pilot took place. All but one of the hundred patients selected consented to being 
seen by optometry practices close to their homes. 
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The telehealth pilot was part of a wider effort to encourage boundary spanning 
innovation in healthcare in the UK. For example, the England and Wales Health and 
Social Care Act 2012 specifically enshrines a ‘fair-playing field’ principle, where 
patients have the right to choose services which best meet their needs, including 
services delivered by charitable and independent providers (Department of Health, 
2010a; 2012). Similarly, one of the principles enshrined in the recent NHS Constitution 
in Britain is that the NHS will work across organizational boundaries with other 
organizations from the public, private and voluntary sector to deliver health care 
(Department of Health, 2013). 
 
Research design: data collection and analysis 
The research was designed in two phases over 6 months (see Table 2). In Phase 1 we 
collected data on the institutional factors influencing the stakeholders’ perceptions of 
the innovation. This involved extensive interviews, prior to adoption, with 
stakeholders involved in the design, development and adoption of the telehealth 
innovation. Phase 2 assessed the outcome of the innovation six months after the 
introduction of the telehealth system and involved follow-up interviews with key 
respondents from both sectors. Phase 1 provided the main source of data for 
conducting the analysis, while the data from Phase 2 served to assess the outcome of 
the innovation. 
 
Research phase Research goal Data collection instrument 
Phase 1, prior to 
adoption 
To collect in depth data 
about the institutional 
contexts, the nature of 
the IT innovation, and 
the perceptions of 
future users about the IT 
innovation.  
Sixteen in depth semi-structures 
interviews with future users, eight 
within the public based Eye clinic, 
and eight within the private 
optometrists practices 
Publicly available information about 
the context, e.g. glaucoma 
guidelines for the Scottish NHS, 
optometrists contracts 
Phase 2, after 6 
months following 
the adoption of 
the innovation 
To collect data about the 
outcome of the IT 
innovation and the 
perceptions of the users 
Four interviews with users, one 
within the clinic, and three with 
optometrists 
Patients questionnaire 
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following the adoption 
and use of the IT 
innovation. 
Table 2. Phases in research design 
 
The respondents (see Table 3 for details of the interviewees) were selected based on 
their involvement with the telehealth innovation (intense), and their role in the IT 
innovation (users/professionals and managers/administrators). At the Eye Clinic we 
interviewed the only ophthalmologist consultant who was glaucoma specialist, run 
the majority of (complex) glaucoma clinics and therefore used the pilot system. We 
also interviewed the only specialist registrar (junior doctor) that was working at the 
time with the ophthalmologist in the glaucoma clinics, and the glaucoma specialist 
nurse who was running the (stable) glaucoma clinic and who was therefore directly 
affected by the innovation. One technician and one receptionist were selected at the 
recommendation of the glaucoma specialist consultant as also being heavily involved 
in running glaucoma clinics. The senior nurse and clinical nurse leader were selected 
due to the nature of their job roles that involved overseeing the clinic services and 
nursing staff and served to assess the wider implications of the innovation for 
managing the clinic. Although there was a potential bias risk in the selecting 
interviewees based on the recommendations of the glaucoma ophthalmologist 
primarily for the technician and receptionist, in practice the respondents included 
most of the clinical staff who worked regularly in the glaucoma clinics and were 
therefore likely to be involved with the telehealth innovation. On the optometrist side, 
we talked with all optometrists involved in using the innovation from the six 
participating practices. In three of these practices the optometrists also doubled as 
managers and practice owners. To differentiate the administrative perspective from 
the professional one we also talked to one of the manager optometrists in one of the 
larger participating optometry practices who was not directly involved in using the 
glaucoma telehealth innovation, but who was responsible for managing the practice. 
We also interviewed the lead optometrist who represented the optometrists’ views 
on the regional NHS board in order to better understand the optometrists’ operating 
context. 
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Group Job description Job role 
Eye Clinic 
staff (C1-8) 
Consultant Runs two glaucoma clinics per week. Deals 
primarily with complex cases. The only 
glaucoma specialist ophthalmologist in the 
clinic, and the only consultant to be involved 
with the innovation 
Specialist Registrar Works with the consultant on the glaucoma 
clinics. Sees stable and complex glaucoma 
cases 
Specialist Nurse  Runs one glaucoma clinic per week. Sees 
stable glaucoma cases 
Senior Nurse Coordinates nursing services in the Eye Clinics 
Clinical Nurse 
Leader 
Manages the nursing staff in the Eye Clinic. 
Budget holder for the eye clinic services 
Clinical Director of 
Neurovascular Unit 
Line manager for clinic medical staff. 
Operations manager for the doctors 
Technician Operates the visual fields machine (a key 
component of the glaucoma test) 
Receptionist Co-ordinates the clinics appointments and 
oversees patient arrivals and paperwork.  
Community 
opticians 
(O1 – 8) 
3 x independent 
optometrists 
Are all owners of practices and practicing 
optometrists 
Lead optometrist in 
NHS Region 
Oversees the future direction of optometrist 
practices in NHS Region. Also acts as advisor to 
optometrists 
Manager Manager of large practice and optometrist, 
travelling around different sites 
3 x employed 
optometrists  
Optometrists employed in larger practices 
Table 3. Description of interviewees and their roles 
 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out using an interview guide (Patton, 1980), 
which ensured consistency in the structure of the interviews while enabling flexibility 
in the questions. Interviewees were asked about their views of the current service and 
their perceptions and expectations of the proposed telehealth innovation. The 
interviews were conducted by the research team and lasted between thirty and ninety 
minutes. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
 
Data analysis started as soon as the first interview took place and progressed gradually 
through iterations between coding, looking for links between codes and seeking 
20 
 
theoretical relationships, searching for patterns into the data, writing narratives and 
revising the literature (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Iterations through data analysis 
 
Two researchers were involved in the early stages of coding, when the initial list of 
codes was defined and then applied to the data. Following agreement on the initial 
list of codes, both researchers proceeded to code the entire set of interviews 
independently, with regular meetings to discuss progress. Any disagreements were 
reconciled gradually during this early coding phase. Once the first phase of coding 
finished, another researcher joined the analysis team and the analysis progressed 
towards identifying links between the codes, and searching for theoretical 
explanations. All revisions in codes at this stage followed discussions and agreement 
between the researchers involved in the analysis.  
 
NVivo, a qualitative analysis software, was used to store the interviews and other 
documentation, and served primarily to support the initial coding of the interviews. 
Most of the analysis process, for example the data displays that supported the analysis 
process, including matrices, causal maps and process flows were done outside NVivo. 
The primary reason behind this decision was the relatively smaller quantity of data, 
which was manageable outside the software, and the different level of NVivo skills 
sets within the research team at the time.  
 
An initial list of codes was developed prior to data collection. This initial list of codes 
was informed by the information systems and institutional literature, and included 
literature review
coding
identify links 
between codes
searching for 
theoretical 
explanations
looking for patterns 
in the data
building narratives
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generic codes referring to the context of adoption such as the current process for 
dealing with glaucoma patients, the perceptions of the benefits and downsides 
associated with the proposed innovation for the different stakeholders (patients, 
Clinic staff and optometrists), and institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic and 
normative). The rationale for this coding was to explore how institutional pressures 
influenced the perceptions of the various stakeholders in the innovation. This list of 
codes was refined as data collection and coding progressed. For example, 
improvement in clinic capacity emerged as a key benefit during the interviews and 
was added to the list. Once the initial coding of the interviews was complete, data 
displays, including causal maps, process flows and matrices were used to further 
refine the data and to develop links between the different concepts and to identify 
emerging theoretical explanations (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Using matrices to 
compare the innovation perceived benefits across the Eye Clinic and the optometrist 
practices served to identify links between the perceptions of the innovation and the 
managerial and technical legitimacies within the two fields. Mapping the causal links 
between institutional pressures (e.g. NHS coercive pressures for reducing waiting 
times and normative pressures for maintaining the standard of care), strategic 
responses (e.g. compromising between different pressures by developing a telehealth 
solution for stable glaucoma patients to improve capacity while providing 
convenience to patients), and expectations for the organizational application of the IT 
innovation (e.g. wide spread deployment of telehealth system to cover most stable 
glaucoma patients) allowed us to build a theoretical explanation for the development 
of organizing visions as emerging from specific strategic responses to conflicting 
institutional pressures. These interpretations were refined against the literature 
review. For example, the concepts of managerial and technical legitimacy (Ruef and 
Scott, 1998) and of organizing vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 2004) emerged at a later 
stage in the data analysis following iterations back to the literature review to explain 
the misalignments between institutional pressures within the two fields, and 
respectively for the different interpretations of IT application developed by the two 
fields. 
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As the links between concepts and the emerging theoretical explanations were 
gradually refined, patterns began to emerge that converged into tentative 
conclusions. For example, for both sets of actors institutional pressures could be 
grouped according to the type of legitimacies, suggesting that institutional 
misalignments emerge from seeking different types of legitimacies. These tentative 
conclusions provided the input into the case narratives that were developed to verify 
that the interpretation derived from the causal maps and matrices were plausible (see 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). Two sets of narratives were built, one to explain 
institutional misalignments and the strategic responses within each organizational 
field (pg 21), and one to explain institutional misalignments and their outcome on 
shaping conflicting visions of innovation across the two fields (pg 28). These narratives 
are discussed in the next section. 
Results and Discussion 
This section examines the institutional forces (RQ1), the misalignments between these 
forces and the responses of organizational actors in shaping the IT innovation 
adoption within (RQ2) and between (RQ3) organizational fields. We conclude the 
section by summarising the results from our analysis in a conceptual framework that 
examines the role of institutional environment in shaping the adoption of boundary 
spanning IT innovations. 
Institutional pressures, misalignments and within field outcomes for IT innovation  
 In both fields, we observed the influence of a conflicting set of institutional pressures, 
driven by divergent demands for managerial and technical legitimacies and resolved 
through compromise strategies. The compromise response strategy generated a 
particular set of expectations concerning the application of the IT innovation within 
each field. 
Public sector 
Three institutional pressures ([1], [2] and [3] in Figure 7) framed the intention to adopt 
the innovation within the public-sector Eye Clinic.  
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Figure 7. Institutional forces shaping the intention to adopt within the Eye Clinic 
 
[1] First, the Clinic staff justified the innovation as benefiting patients, suggesting that 
coercive pressures for increased patient convenience and quality of care drove the 
innovation (Table 4, Quote H1). For example, respondents emphasised that patients 
would receive care closer to their homes (H2), that they would be seen within a less 
stressful environment than the hospital (H3), and that the quality of care would 
improve for both stable (H4) and complex glaucoma patients (H5). This focus on 
patients was consistent with both managerial norms defining the performance targets 
for improving quality, safety and ‘the patient experience’ (managerial legitimacy); and 
with technical norms of professional excellence and work procedures (technical 
legitimacy) within the public health sector. For example, a “patient-centred care” 
agenda has been at the heart of health policies and reforms of successive UK 
governments, resulting in the implementation of measurements, target-setting, and 
the use of increased accountability and performance management systems within the 
NHS (Department of Health, 2010a; 2013; King’s Fund 2011). Similarly, a focus on 
patient care delivered in partnerships with patients is at the heart of the UK medical 
profession (General Medical Council, 2013), while the professional standards 
governing the quality of care for glaucoma and endorsed by both ophthalmologists 
and ophthalmic nurses professional associations in the UK emphasise a positive 
[2] Demands for 
meeting managerial 
targets (reduce 
waiting times) => 
coercive pressures
[3] Demands for high 
standard of patient 
care as required by 
professional norms 
=> normative
pressures
Organizational application of telehealth innovation: 
large-scale outsourcing of less complex but capacity 
consuming patients
[1] Espoused focus on patients as 
required by technical and managerial 
norms for patient-centred care => 
coercive pressures
Compromise strategy: balancing conflicting demands for 
managerial and technical legitimacy
Types of 
legitimacy => 
Institutional 
pressures
Strategic 
responses
Outcome of 
IT innovation 
adoption at 
field level
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experience for the patient in a caring and safe environment (NICE, 2011). This 
emphasis on patients’ care and convenience in justifying the innovation was evidence 
of a coercive pressure to explain all initiatives as ‘patient-focused’ in order to comply 
with the overall NHS strategy of ‘patient-centredness’, fulfilling both the professional 
and managerial expectations for desirable and appropriate action within the NHS. 
 
[2] Second the coercive pressure to meet government targets to reduce waiting times 
was another key driver for the Clinic to support the innovation. The Clinic suffered 
from severe capacity shortages that affected its ability to accommodate patients 
during appointments, and to see new patients within the timescales recommended by 
government targets (H6). With the number of elderly people in the UK growing, it was 
expected that the capacity problems and associated difficulties in meeting 
government targets would become more acute in the future (H7). The assumption was 
that if local optometrists could see stable glaucoma patients, the number of patients 
seen in the Clinic could be reduced, hence improving capacity. Adoption was thus 
largely driven by the need to comply with managerial norms for meeting the efficiency 
targets laid down by governmental bodies regulating the NHS (Department of Health, 
2010b) by reducing the waiting times for Clinic appointments.  
 
[3] Finally, normative pressures to maintain quality of care and allow for professional 
skills development were also mentioned by respondents as significant drivers for the 
innovation. By alleviating the capacity problems within the clinic, the innovation was 
perceived to lead to lighter staff workloads which would allow more time for staff 
training, to reduce job stress for nurses, and to increase the time spent per patient, 
thus improving both the quality of care and professional skills development (H8). A 
focus on skills development and an emphasis on patient care are consistent with 
expectations developed during professional training and with normative work 
procedures and quality assurance mechanisms (NICE, 2011; Royal College of 
Ophthalmologists, 2011). The demands for technical legitimacy thus manifested as 
normative pressures that justified the adoption of the telehealth innovation.  
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The telehealth innovation was thus an attempt by the Clinic staff to respond to a 
combination of [1] coercive pressures to improve patients experience; [2] coercive 
pressures to satisfy managerial demands to meet government targets; and [3] 
normative pressures to maintain the standard of care. Improving patients experience 
fulfilled demands for both managerial and technical legitimacy through patient-
centred care. In contrast, the pressure to meet government mandated targets to see 
more patients while dealing with diminishing physical capacity was driven by the need 
for managerial legitimacy and was in conflict with the normative requirements for 
technical legitimacy within the clinical profession. These normative demands required 
clinical staff to spend a set amount of time with each patient during appointments, 
and to allow time within their schedule for professional development, thus adding to 
capacity problems. The telehealth system was thus seen by the Clinic staff as a means 
of resolving this institutional misalignment through a compromise strategy (Oliver, 
1991): the innovation would balance the different demands by outsourcing the care 
of stable glaucoma patients to trained optometrists. This would release clinic time to 
improve care for patients with complex and acute glaucoma who were seen as having 
more clinical requirements than stable glaucoma patients. It was also anticipated that 
optometrists could provide the same standard of care to stable glaucoma patients in 
a setting that was arguably more convenient for the patients. This compromise 
strategy thus led to a particular vision of the application of the telehealth system 
within the Clinic (see Swanson and Ramiller, 2004) who envisaged the innovation to 
accommodate large-scale outsourcing of less complex but capacity consuming 
patients. This organizing vision for large scale deployment was used by the innovator 
actors within the public sector to legitimise the innovation and rally support within 
the Clinic by emphasising the ability of the innovation to alleviate capacity problems 
and improve standards of care while providing greater convenience to patients.  
Private sector optometry practices 
Three institutional pressures ([1], [2] and [3] in Figure 8) framed the intention to adopt 
the innovation within the private based optometrist practices. In the UK, community-
based optometrists operate as private businesses and therefore need to make a profit. 
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Much of this profit comes from dispensing glasses and contact lenses to patients, not 
from standard eye tests or from monitoring patients with specific conditions. The local 
optometrists included two distinct stakeholder perspectives: the optometrists in their 
role as healthcare professionals employed within a practice, and practices as 
businesses, sometimes run by the owner-optometrist and sometimes by employed 
professional managers. 
 
 
Figure 8. Institutional forces shaping the intention to adopt within the optometrists 
practices 
 
[1] First, mimetic pressures played a minor role in shaping the innovation. The 
potential uptake and outcome of the innovation was uncertain, so practices felt some 
pressure to copy early adopter behaviour. Some of the practices expressed concerns 
that if they were not involved early, patients would somehow see them as being less 
capable, offering regular customers an inferior service compared to those practices 
involved with the innovation. The benefits for the businesses of adopting the 
innovation, however, were generally perceived to be small, as it was thought unlikely 
that the innovation would attract customers to the practice through transforming 
glaucoma patients into paying (and therefore profitable) customers. The concern for 
improving customer service and achieving competitive differentiation in the market – 
a form of managerial legitimacy - played only a minor role in persuading practices to 
[2] Demands (by 
managers) for 
meeting the 
commercial needs of 
the practice => 
coercive pressures
[3] Demands (by 
optometrists) for 
professional 
development through 
clinical skill set 
development => 
normative pressures
Organizational application of telehealth innovation : 
small-scale take up of complex but time-consuming 
and unprofitable customers 
Compromise strategy: balancing conflicting demands for 
managerial and technical legitimacy
[1] The risk of not adopting if other practices 
in the area adopt, leading to perceived 
differences in professional status generating 
potential commercial disadvantage (mimetic)
Types of 
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Outcome of 
IT innovation 
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mimic the actions of lead users. Instead, the perceived business benefits were more 
often linked to the optometrists’ professional development, and thus to technical 
legitimacy. Some respondents mentioned that customers might view the practices 
involved in glaucoma monitoring as having a higher level of clinical skills than non-
participating competitors. They hoped that this improved perception of individual 
optometrists professional skills might then translate into the practice attracting more 
customers (L1). Mimetic pressures were therefore linked to the need to achieve the 
level of professional clinical skills expected by customers as being attained by early 
adopters of the innovation. The mimetic pressure experienced by private optometry 
practices thus reflected a combination of demands for both managerial and technical 
legitimacy, with the latter tending to dominate.  
 
[2] Second, coercive pressures linked to profitability expectations for a private practice 
shaped the telehealth adoption by optometrists. While optometrists were keen to 
take on a few glaucoma patients as part of the pilot, they all expressed reservations 
about the general impact on practice profitability of seeing large numbers of patients. 
Respondents emphasised that the payment from the Clinic for monitoring glaucoma 
patients in the telehealth pilot barely covered the costs of the session (L2), and that 
seeing glaucoma patients carried an opportunity cost. Moreover, optometrists 
considered stable glaucoma monitoring as more complex (L3), and thus more time-
consuming and costly than the services typically provided by optometry practices. 
Both owners and employed practice optometrists emphasised that, to remain 
commercially viable, they could see only a limited number of glaucoma patients (L6, 
L7 and L8). Any outsourcing of patient care from the Clinic to optometry practices 
would be therefore limited by the requirement of practices to meet profitability 
expectations (L4 and L5). This coercive pressure to meet the managerial and wider 
organizational (in the case of the larger practices) expectations of profitability 
emerged as a significant constraint in shaping the approach to the innovation in the 
private sector. 
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[3] Finally, the key pressure driving telehealth adoption in the private sector was 
normative: all of the optometrists interviewed saw themselves as part of a profession 
dealing with patients, and not solely as business managers dealing with clients. As 
such, they felt they would gain professional satisfaction by getting involved in 
monitoring glaucoma patients (L9). Both practice owners (L10 and L11) and employed 
optometrists (L12) argued that dealing with glaucoma patients on a regular basis, 
being more involved with treatment, and working closely with clinicians would help 
build their expertise and professional skills. For example, one optometrist explained 
that she was keen to be involved because she did not like to “miss out on anything”, 
particularly developments that might drive the profession forward (L13). In general 
there was also a feeling that increased job variety fitted with the optometrists’ own 
career aspirations and their aspirations as professionals (L14). This technical 
legitimacy-driven focus on clinical skills development is consistent with the normative 
requirements prescribed for the profession by the optometrists’ professional body in 
the UK (College of Optometrists, 2012).  
 
The adoption of the innovation was thus an attempt by the optometrist practices to 
respond to a combination of [1] mimetic pressures to follow early adopter practices; 
[2] coercive pressures to meet the commercial needs of the practice; and [3] 
normative pressures to improve the level of professional skills. The demands for both 
technical and, to a lesser extent, managerial legitimacies to achieve differentiation in 
the market were met by mimicking the actions of those practices that were seen to 
be early adopters. In contrast, coercive and normative pressures exhibited a 
significant misalignment because of the different demands for managerial and 
technical legitimacy. Managerial legitimacy emphasised the need to engage with 
paying customers to maintain profitability levels, while technical legitimacy resulted 
in optometrists taking on non-profit making patients in order to engage with the Clinic 
and develop clinical skills. These tensions were evident in the language used by 
respondents: while optometrists talked about ‘patients’ in relation to the 
development of clinical skills, they referred to ‘customers’ when making a distinction 
between profitable customers who bought glasses, and non-profitable customers, 
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such as glaucoma patients. The misalignment was resolved through a compromise 
strategy (Oliver, 1996): coercive and normative pressures were balanced by each 
practice taking only a small number of patients (typically two or three) per month. 
Seeing a small number of patients maintained a practice’s profitability target 
expectations, while also enabling optometrists to develop their clinical skills through 
delivering glaucoma care. The compromise strategy led to a vision of the telehealth 
innovation that was to be applied within optometry practices (see Swanson and 
Ramiller, 2004) to support small scale outsourcing of glaucoma care. This organizing 
vision of small scale deployment allowed optometrists to legitimise the innovation 
within their own field and to mobilise support from both managers and professional 
optometrists by emphasising the ability of the innovation to develop clinical skills and 
to support differentiation, while having only a marginal impact of profitability margins. 
Institutional pressures, misalignments and across field outcomes for IT innovation  
We found that institutional misalignments arose as a result of diverse demands for 
technical and managerial legitimacies within and between fields. We also found that 
within field misalignments were amplified as tensions arose between the two fields. 
These misalignments compounded the differences between the organizing visions of 
the IT innovation developed within each field. The inability to reconcile these visions 
into a cohesive approach to telehealth deployment across the public and private 
sectors ultimately led to the abandonment of the innovation. 
 
After six months, the pilot was stopped and the telehealth system abandoned. Follow-
up interviews in Phase 2 found that optometrists experienced only minor technical 
difficulties transmitting data to the Clinic. This was associated with poor connectivity 
and/or the time involved in logging onto the system to send information. No other 
technical challenges were encountered, and all respondents emphasised the positive 
comments made by patients, particularly about improved convenience. The 
consultant ophthalmologist reported that the telehealth pilot met his original 
expectations in terms of the general performance of the technology, and the outcome 
for patients. 
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The primary reason given by all parties for the failure of the innovation was that the 
pilot could not be scaled-up to the larger scale required to alleviate the Clinic’s 
capacity problems. The inability to scale-up the pilot reflected the conflict between 
the two organizing visions within each field: the small-scale deployment to cater for a 
small group of clinically complex but unprofitable customers envisaged by the 
optometrist community versus the large scale deployment to outsource a large group 
of what was perceived as less complex but capacity-consuming patients by the clinical 
community. It became clear during Phase 1 of data collection, and was confirmed 
during Phase 2, that these visions could not be reconciled; the community 
optometrists were not able to achieve their business objectives and to see the number 
of patients required to have a significant impact on the capacity issues faced by the 
Clinic. The tensions noted in the organizing visions within each of the two fields were 
amplified by the institutional misalignments between the two fields. Figure 9 
summaries these tensions. We can identify two sets of conflicts (grey arrows 1 and 3) 
and two sets of alignments (white arrows 2 and 4) that shaped the adoption decision 
between fields. 
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Figure 9: Tensions between the public and the private sector leading to the 
abandonment of the innovation 
 
[1] In both fields, a key constraint on the application of the innovation related to the 
coercive pressures arising from the need to fulfil managerial expectations for 
economic efficiency and performance management systems. As was discussed in the 
previous section, in the Clinic the coercive pressure to meet government imposed 
targets pushed them to try to reduce capacity problems by maximising the 
outsourcing of patient care. In the private optometry practices the coercive pressure 
to meet the commercial needs of the practices pushed them to seek to minimise the 
provision of those services– such as routine monitoring - that were not associated with 
the dispensing of lenses. Each coercive pressure was very strong in its respective field, 
and the conflict between these pressures across the fields largely accounts for the 
difficulty in reconciling the field-level organizing visions for the innovation.  
 
[2] The pressure to meet managerial targets and to reduce waiting times within the 
Clinic was aligned with normative pressures within the optometry practices to develop 
professional clinical skills. Outsourcing stable glaucoma care to trained optometrists 
would have allowed the Clinic to meet waiting time targets, and the optometrists to 
practice clinical skills and to receive on-the-job training and feedback from the 
ophthalmologist consultant. This strong alignment between the demands for 
managerial legitimacy within the clinical setting and technical legitimacy within 
optometrist practices explains why the innovation was initiated at all.  
 
[3] Third, a strong misalignment existed between the normative pressures to maintain 
the standard of care within the Clinic and the coercive pressures to meet profitability 
expectations within optometry practices. Within the Clinic, the normative pressures 
for providing appropriate patient care meant dedicating enough time to each patient. 
For example, the UK professional guidelines for ophthalmic outpatient service 
prescribes 15-20 minutes per appointment, with the expectation that more time may 
be required to conduct all the necessary tests within a single appointment session 
32 
 
(Royal College of Ophthalmologists, 2011). The perception among Clinic staff was that 
optometrists could spend more time per patient, thus enhancing quality of care (H4). 
This focus on technical norms of behaviour and expectations within the Clinic could 
also explain why none of the respondents from the Clinic considered whether the 
amount of reimbursement for the optometrists’ services was appropriate. For local 
optometry practices however, the Clinic’s expectations that optometrists would 
spend a significant amount of time on non-profitable customers conflicted with the 
coercive pressure to meet their own managerial norms for profitability. Different 
expectations of what was appropriate within each field, (focus on patient care versus 
making money from seeing paying customers) increased the gulf between what each 
set of actors saw as the appropriate application of the innovation (their organizing 
visions). 
 
[4] Finally, the technical norms for engaging in patient-centred care in the Clinic, and 
for developing clinical skills to differentiate optometrist practices in the marketplace 
were aligned. In both cases, the key benefits of the innovation were seen through the 
eyes of patients. Like the clinicians (H1, H2 and H3), the optometrists emphasised the 
benefits of the telehealth innovation to patients in terms of increased convenience 
arising from shorter travel times (L15), shorter waiting times during appointments 
(L16) and lower levels of stress and greater comfort for patients (L17). In addition, as 
was explained in the previous section, by engaging with glaucoma patients 
optometrists hoped that their practices would be perceived as differentiated in the 
market as a consequence of demonstrating a more advanced set of clinical skills (L1). 
For optometrists, however, the mimetic pressures stemming from technical demands 
for improving clinical skills were weak, and this alignment did not play a significant 
role in shaping the innovation.  
 
Ultimately, the misalignments between the demands for legitimacy within the two 
sectors (arrows 1 and 3 in Figure 11) prevailed and explain the inability to agree on a 
coherent organizing vision between the two fields. The telehealth innovation was 
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abandoned, and other ways to deliver glaucoma care remotely are currently being 
explored. 
Boundary spanning IT adoption: legitimacy, institutional misalignments, strategic 
responses and organizing visions  
Our analysis of the institutional pressures, the drivers for institutional misalignments 
and their role in shaping the adoption of boundary spanning IT innovations is 
summarised in the conceptual framework described in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Conceptual framework 
 
In line with existing research (Liu et al., 2008; Son and Bensabat, 2007; Teo et al., 2003, 
Tsai et al., 2013), we observed that a full range of institutional pressures: coercive, 
normative and to a lesser extent mimetic, influenced IT adoption within organizations 
(RQ1). However, in contrast to much of the existing IT innovation literature, we found 
that these pressures did not operate as a coherent whole, even within the same 
organizational field. Echoing the findings of Currie and Guah (2007) on adoption at a 
field level, in examining adoption at organizational level we noted that the innovation 
is shaped by conflicting institutional logics. Our analysis indicate that the emergence 
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of institutional misalignments within and between fields is linked to different types of 
legitimacies (RQ2a and RQ3a). Within each field, actors responded to conflicting 
demands by engaging in compromise strategies that shaped their expectations about 
the organizational application of the innovation. Two distinct ‘compromised’ visions 
of organisational application thus emerged in each field which allowed each set of 
actors to legitimise the innovation and rally support for adoption within their fields 
(RQ2b). The degree of institutional misalignment between the fields influenced the 
degree to which the separately formed organizing visions could be reconciled (RQ3b). 
The inability to reconcile these two field-level organizing visions into a single coherent 
organizing vision ultimately resulted in the boundary spanning innovation being 
abandoned. Thus, even in a situation where compromises within fields were achieved, 
adoption of the boundary spanning innovation was ultimately determined by the 
ability (or inability) of both fields to arrive at a single, coherent, organizing vision.  
Conclusions 
This study makes three main contributions to information systems research. First, we 
contribute to research on IT innovation adoption by identifying one type of innovation, 
boundary spanning innovation, whose adoption cuts across different institutional 
fields. We argue that the hybrid nature of such innovations heightens the role that 
institutional misalignments play in shaping their adoption. As illustrated in our case 
study, institutional misalignments can often be resolved through compromise 
strategies that balance conflicting institutional demands within particular 
organizational fields. These conflicting demands tend to play a more minor role for 
innovations whose adoption is confined to a single organizational field. In contrast, for 
boundary spanning innovation, our findings indicate that the institutional 
misalignments between different adopting fields may amplify the conflicts at field 
level by reducing the ability of actors to reconcile their expectations of the 
organizational application of the innovation. To be successful, boundary spanning 
innovations need to combine diverse institutional logics in novel ways. While hybridity 
has been recently the subject of much research in institutional literature (e.g. Battilana 
and Dorado, 2010; Glynn, 2000), there has been less interest in information systems 
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research to examine IT innovations that exhibit hybrid features. Generally, 
institutional insights into the adoption of IT innovations have been examined within 
the confines of particular organizational fields, such as healthcare (e.g. Cho and 
Mathiassen, 2007; Currie and Guah, 2007; Jensen et al., 2009), the automotive 
industry (Hertwig, 2012) or government (Standing et al., 2009), obscuring the role that 
between-field misalignments play in shaping the pattern of adoption. Our study 
proposes an institutionally-driven conceptual framework that identifies appropriate 
tools to analyse the adoption of such hybrid IT innovations. 
 
Second, our findings augment the growing literature on why IT innovations often fail 
to fulfil their potential, or are poorly implemented. We have observed that while user 
leadership, commitment and engagement in innovation have been described as vital 
in information systems research (Butler, 2003), they are not sufficient conditions for 
adoption. Instead, in highly professionalised settings such as healthcare (Ferlie et al., 
2005; Willcocks, 2004), professional orchestras (Glynn, 2000), or engineering 
industries (Mueller and Carter, 2007), where there are significant misalignments 
between the technical and managerial norms that characterise different 
organizational actors, the adoption of IT innovations is likely to involve conflicting 
norms. Our research deepens the understanding of IT adoption in hybrid 
environments characterised by conflicting demands for legitimacy. We have 
demonstrated the importance of misalignments between institutional factors within 
and between fields in explaining IT adoption (or the lack thereof) in contested 
environments.  
 
Finally, our findings advance the current debates in IT institutional research. Most IT 
institutional research to-date emphasised homogeneity, and only recently has 
research started to consider the effect of conflicting institutional logics on 
organizations (Jensen et al., 2009). We have examined institutional misalignments 
that arise within and between organizational fields involved in innovation adoption. 
We have developed a framework that explains the emergence of such misalignments, 
and that considers a range of possible responses to these misalignments. In contrast, 
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most IT research tends to focus on acquiescence responses to institutional pressures, 
rather than exploring other strategies for acquiring legitimacy (Mignerat and Rivard, 
2009). More importantly, we have found that within each field the strategic responses 
to institutional misalignments shaped the actors’ understanding of the organizational 
application of the innovation, leading to the development of different organizing 
visions. We thus explain the outcome of a boundary spanning innovation through the 
ability (or lack of it) of actors to reconcile their within-field organizing visions and to 
develop a coherent organizing vision of the innovation between fields. Our research 
thus extends the organizing vision concept developed by Swanson and Ramiller (1997) 
to explain how the adoption of an innovation at the organizational level is influenced 
by both within-field and between-field factors. 
 
The study has a number of limitations. First, it focused primarily on the intention to 
adopt; the analysis of the implementation process has not been included in the 
analysis. Many innovations fail not because they are not sustained by users, but 
because their objectives are not achieved during implementation (Klein and Sorra, 
1996). To understand the role that institutional (mis)alignments play in shaping 
innovation adoption and failure more fully, future research would need to analyse 
stakeholder behaviours and perceptions during implementation.  
 
Second, we focused on a case where the actors could not reconcile their expectations 
during the organizational deployment of the innovation, and the innovation was 
abandoned. We have not examined the mechanisms through which actors can change 
their organizing visions by, for example, compromising their own expectations, or by 
adjusting the expectations of the others in order to develop a coherent vision between 
fields to support the adoption. Further research using a multi-case study design would 
enable further development and testing of the conceptual framework to include 
strategies for reconciling organizing visions. 
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Table 4. Summary of evidence 
Focus on ... Explanation Exemplary quotes 
PUBLIC SECTOR: Hospital based clinic staff 
Patients Convenience of 
being seen 
locally  
 “I think the main benefits are meant to be for the patients, because they will not need to travel. They will 
have appointments at the time that they are told. They are going to have secondary care at a local level” 
(C1, Quote H1) 
Reduces travel 
time and cost to 
patients 
“[the main benefits include] patient travel time, parking, better service provided, better training. To be 
honest, I think the patients would benefit most, because they wouldn’t be travelling in to [Hospital City]” 
(C6, Quote H2) 
Reduces patient 
anxiety 
“you can save the patient undue anxiety that is associated with attending the clinic, and wondering “what’s 
going on with my eyes?”” (C2, Quote H3) 
Improve patient 
treatment 
compliance 
Maybe if people could just drop into their opticians, I’m not saying the opticians will be sitting there with 
nothing to do … but if they could access treatment or access care a little bit more easily, rather than actually 
going through the rigours of getting an outpatient’s appointment here, you could improve compliance [with 
treatment regimens] because that is actually something that we don’t do enough of here. It would help 
promotion, the follow-up, just explain to people how important compliance is. At the moment we neither 
have the facilities nor the time to do it.” (C4, Quote H4) 
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More clinic time 
available for 
complex cases 
“if in the clinic [we had] those more complex patients that probably can’t be managed by the optometrist, 
then I would imagine that we would reduce the numbers in the clinic. So we would have a bit more time 
with each individual patient, which would ensure that they got a high quality of care” (C6, Quote H5) 
Clinic staff 
 
Improved clinic 
capacity and 
meeting 
management  
“I have concerns that waiting time targets measure new patients’ appointments. Because we have a partial 
booking system, I worry sometimes that we say, ‘We’ll see them in six months,’ but they actually disappear 
into the ether and it could be that they are waiting longer than six months for their return appointments, 
because we just don’t have enough capacity” (C6, Quote H6). 
Future capacity 
problems 
because of aging 
population 
“As the population get older, we’re going to get more patients.  Doesn’t matter what we do, we’re going to 
get more patients, and if it means we can see some of these out in the community or in any way increase 
our capacity, it’s got to be good. As it [is] just now I don’t think we can go much longer without the whole 
thing collapsing around our ears because it’s getting to the where point there are just too many patients” 
(C3, Quote H7). 
Staff skill 
development 
and the provision 
of quality of care  
“it would make things easier because I would be able to provide a better [service] and nurses would have 
the time that they need to develop [skills], as opposed to doing their ultimate best to get all these patients 
through the clinics with such a fast turnover They’d be able to give a better quality of care” (C5, Quote H8). 
PRIVATE SECTOR: Local optometrist practices 
45 
 
Optometry 
practices 
gaining extra 
customers 
through 
perceived better 
professional 
skills  
“I: You would get more involved with the treatment of these patients? 
R: Yes. 
I:Or is this in terms of professional development? 
R: Yeah, yeah.  Also it’s good for the practice you know, if people get to know that you’re doing this as well 
you know, it’s advertising in a way.” (O1, Quote L1)  
Payment fee for 
glaucoma care 
“Profitability could be an issue if [patient] numbers get excessive, but I don’t think with this sort of system 
they would be. A break-even figure for a practice is around £120 per hour. So we’re just breaking even at 
the fees that have been agreed for this. It’s not going to make the practice profitable” (O1, Quote L2) 
Time consuming 
during learning 
period & need to 
change  
“[the consultant] has asked me to do specific tests that are different from the tests that I would normally do 
and it’s all new to me. It’s not like my normal routine. Although [the consultant] is not asking me to do 
anything that I can’t do, it’s just different from what I normally do. [In time] it’ll get better” (O6, Quote L3) 
Potential impact 
on practice 
profitability 
 “By seeing a lot more glaucoma patients and becoming an offshoot of the hospital, we are reducing the 
business for dispensing glasses This has certainly been raised as a concern for other areas where the hospital 
has shifted the balance of care. Obviously in the hospital they are paid through an NHS contract salary, not 
as a business” (O2, Quote L4). 
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 “my manager will tell you that she hates it because these are people who are not our patients, they’re not 
buying glasses, they’re not making us any money whatsoever. So from a financial point of view it’s very poor 
for the practice” (O6, Quote L5). 
Practices could 
take only a small 
number of 
patients 
“[because of the economic downturn] we are probably seeing a lot more non-prescribing patients. At the 
moment we have room for them [so] it depends how many there are of them. If it’s only one of two then 
yes, fine, we can fit them in without too much bother” (O4, Quote L6). 
“If it was massive numbers, it would not be financially viable for us to do.” (O8, L7). 
“It would depend a bit on the number of patients. If it was only going to be a small number of practices 
doing it, but a large number of patients, then yes, that would have a negative impact on business and I think 
practices would then be reluctant to take part because managers would not be making any money because 
we would have too many patients” (O3, Quote L8). 
Optometrist Professional 
satisfaction 
through fuller 
use of skills set 
“It does give you a wee bit more variety in your work and also the chance to use the skills you actually 
studied for at university. We were trained to have a look to see if there’s anything that’s not quite right with 
the eyes and it’s quite nice to actually get the responsibility to be the one to make sure that their glaucoma 
is still stable” (O7, Quote L9) 
 Development 
and refinement 
of skills and 
“There are a few drivers really.  There’s definitely the one of increasing professional skills and being involved 
in more varied eye care work … Certainly for me there would be professional satisfaction in improving my 
clinical skills” (O1, Quote L10) 
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enhancement of 
profession 
“I think it’s good from my point of view because we will be able to be involved more in the management 
and treatment of these patients” (O4, Quote L11). 
“I’m interested in any further development in any sort of shared care system. I think it’s the way our 
profession should go … I do think it’s the way that eye care should go, removing people from centrally-based 
hospitals into the community if they can” (O1, Quote L12).   
“I don’t like to be left out of anything! That’s basically it really. I am very forward thinking about optometry 
and it’s one of those things that’s good for bringing us forward and get involved with these things” (O4, 
Quote L13). 
 Increased job 
satisfaction 
through variety 
“As an optometrist I like the variety … You’ve got all sorts of different things that you’re seeing and I’m quite 
involved in pathology and the medical side of it. I quite like that side of it” (O6, Quote L14) 
Patients Being seen 
locally, in a 
familiar and non-
clinical 
environment 
“I think there’s a huge benefit … because patients don’t have to go to hospital. The service would be much 
more localised which, for older patients is a huge issue; they want to be seen as locally as possible” (O1, 
Quote L15). 
“It’s all done in probably an hour versus spending four or five hours [waiting] at the hospital, plus travelling 
time” (O3, Quote L16). 
“They’re familiar with [the local village] and familiar with this practice and the staff here so they’re a wee 
bit more at ease about coming in. They’re not so tense and they’re not coming to see a doctor, they’re 
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coming to see an optician who’s maybe a wee bit more human in their eyes; they’re not some sort of super-
brain. They just feel a wee bit more relaxed” (O7, Quote L17). 
 
